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Abstract
Apart from health care and education, it could be argued that working-age households
with above-average income in the UK have never relied as much on the welfare state as their
counterparts in many other European countries. How then do better-earning households expect
to cope financially with the risk of unemployment, and to what extent do they plan ahead for
a possible loss of earnings? Based on sixty-one interviews with couples, the article discusses
various sources of income protection that these households envisage drawing upon in the event
of unemployment. State benefits figure only marginally, private insurances to a limited extent
and savings slightly more. However, there is little evidence of strategic planning. By contrast,
many perceive their current job and personal employability as providing some security and
regard the prospect of occupational redundancy pay as a major source of income protection.
This finding contrasts sharply with a paucity of systematic information about the actual scope,
quality and development of employer-based income security.
Introduction
British social policy research tends to concentrate on the needs of disadvantaged
groups in society and on the state as the key actor of welfare provision. In some
respects, this seems only reasonable given the emphasis on an encompassing
system of public subsistence-based social protection, as formulated by William
Beveridge in the aftermath of World War II. On the other hand, it could be
argued that such a focus seems somewhat restrictive if the analytical interest is
not state action but the quality and scope of social protection as experienced
by citizens. Accordingly, instead of assessing the reach of public provision, an
alternative point of departure could be individuals and their interests in, and
actions towards, achieving a certain level of income protection. Public policy can
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be assumed to play a part in this, but there is no reason to assume that it does so
exclusively.
Indeed, for certain households non-statutory forms of social protection play
prominent roles. Workplaces (for pensions, health care), banks and insurance
companies (personal pensions, mortgage protection, critical illness cover) as well
as home ownership (imputed retirement income) are relevant sources of income
security, complementing or substituting statutory provision. Burchardt and Hills
(1997) and Burchardt et al., (1999) have provided important conceptual and
empirical groundwork in this field, and, more recently, social policy research
has indeed paid more attention to the analysis of public–private mixes of
mandatory protection and voluntary options of risk management (e.g., Powell,
2007). However, apart from pensions (e.g., Clark and Whiteside, 2003; Meyer
et al., 2007; Clark and Strauss, 2008) empirical research has hardly begun to
assess ‘public–private’ security options from the perspective of contemporary
households.
In the context of the emergence of a stronger consumer- and choice-
orientation in several policy areas since the early 1990s (such as in health
care, education or pension provision), and a perceived transformation of the
‘redistributive’ and ‘provider’ towards a ‘regulatory’ and ‘investment’ state, Klein
and Millar (1995: 312) advocated a ‘paradigm shift’ towards studying ‘do-it-
yourself’ social policy, that is ways in which citizens design their own ‘welfare
packages’. As a consequence, social policy analysis would need to theoretically
and normatively engage with and reappraise the notion of choice, autonomy and
individual decision making, while reflecting on ways in which collective action
could facilitate the exercise of choice without exacerbating inequalities.
On the whole, such a reorientation has not occurred, possibly because it
may have tipped social policy analysis too much towards an emphasis on (free)
‘agency’ at the expense of (constraining) ‘structure’. There is ample research
which shows that the capacity, and propensity, to actively pursue personal social
protection strategies is influenced by class, income, age and other social divisions
(Rowlingson, 2000, 2002; Abbott et al., 2006; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006;
Breakwell, 2007; Cebulla, 2007; Clark and Strauss, 2008). Those with lower
incomes have often little choice but to rely on public provision, possibly in
addition to voluntary and informal forms of support. Apart from anything
else, a lack of disposable income makes personal income protection planning
prohibitive. Furthermore, certain stipulations attached to private insurance
policies linked to job status and employment tenure exclude many low income
and other disadvantaged groups from this particular form of ‘do-it-yourself’
social policy.
By contrast, many better-off income earners can be assumed to be in
a financial position which allows some form of personal income protection
planning. Moreover, above-average income households can be expected to be
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motivated to do so due to the failure of public provision to maintain relative
living standards. During the 1960s, there was a tentative shift towards making
unemployment benefits and other transfers more relevant for middle and
better income earners with the introduction of earnings-related supplements.
This period proved to be rather short-lived however, with the return to flat-
rate support in the 1980s. In addition, a retrenchment of insurance-based
benefits and steady deterioration in the value of benefits relative to average
wages indicates a shift towards an (almost) exclusive orientation on needs-
based public provision as the dominant notion of state support endorsed by
Conservative and subsequently Labour governments in the 1990s. All major
political parties nowadays justify such an approach as directing scarce public
resources towards those with no other forms of income protection, implying
that other income groups would be able to rely on their own private provision.
However, apart from pensions (e.g., Wood et al., 2012), the question of which
types of private and public income protection households actually make use
of, and to what extent, has rarely been systematically investigated. Moreover,
existing research has tended to concentrate on investigations into single means of
income protection, such as private unemployment insurance (Cebulla, 2000) or
mortgage payment protection (Pryce, 2002; Pryce and Keoghan, 2002; Ford et al.,
2004), rather than on households and ways in which diverse sources of income
protection are perceived and anticipated to be relied upon during periods out of
work.
In what follows, we address this issue with respect to the loss of earnings due
to unemployment. Based on interviews with sixty-one couples, we investigate
how better-off households expect to cope financially during periods out of work,
and which sources of income replacement they perceive to be relevant (and which
less so). We concentrate on couples rather than individuals, as decisions on the
type and level of income protection are likely to be made in the context of the
family. We focus on households with above-average earnings (as specified below)
for two reasons. First, it allows us to engage with and explore issues such as choice,
strategic planning and decision making, as suggested by Klein and Millar (1995).
The option of taking out private insurance, for example, presupposes a certain
level of regular disposable income. However, we consider such an approach as
relevant beyond this particular social group. For decades, successive governments
have shifted the responsibility for, and risk associated with, income protection
from the state to (not only better-off) households. Propagating the take-up of
private sources of income protection, such as personal pensions, governments
have aimed to increase levels of financial ‘capability’ and ‘literacy’ with the hope of
improving households’ awareness, willingness and capacity to engage in planning
for personal income security (e.g., England and Chatterjee, 2005). Exploring the
perceptions of better-off households should help to assess the credibility of this
policy shift more generally.
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Data and methods: interviews with couples
Based on a broader project, this article draws on data generated from in-depth
face-to-face interviews with sixty-one couples. The interviews were split between
the Reading area and Glasgow. One aim of the project was to capture what
households with at least one member in full-time employment thought they
would rely on financially in the event of unemployment.1 The interview schedule
covered the areas of public provision, private insurance, savings, property, familial
and employer-related provision. There was also scope for interviewees to suggest
other forms of income security not given prior consideration by the research
team. Couples were asked about both their attitudes towards diverse sources of
income protection and any planning related to these.
Couples were interviewed together and the analysis is at the household
level. The sample selection process aimed to explore attitudes within a fairly
homogenous group of households, rather than to capture much further
differentiation. Couples were selected according to certain characteristics, which
delineate a group of households likely to have both the means and the motivation
to protect their household income.2 Both partners were aged between thirty and
fifty-five, so as to have the best chance to recruit households of core working age,
who had finished training, but were not yet preparing for retirement. Couples
had at least one dependent child living with them. As reflected by some of the
interviewees, having a young family is a phase in life associated with changing
attitudes and increased motivation to consider income protection, and this was
the rationale for focusing on couples with dependent children.
All couples had a total household income above £40,000 which put them
in the top 40 per cent of the equivalised household income distribution. This
threshold was selected as an indicator of a household’s relative ability to engage
with a range of forms of income protection. The baseline is just a little higher
than the median income for households with the above characteristics, and
not much above £37,000 which is considered necessary for a couple with two
children to have a ‘socially acceptable’ standard of living (Davis et al., 2012:
29). The sample was broadly divided into just above middle and higher income
households. Only homeowners were selected, typically with a mortgage still to
pay. The majority of households in the UK sharing the characteristics outlined
above are homeowners.3 Furthermore, homeowners have recourse to certain
income protection options that are of interest to the study.
The focus of the paper is on income protection planning against the loss of
earnings due to unemployment, hence the selection of households with at least
one member of the couple in full-time employment, and, in some cases, in self-
employment. The majority of respondents worked as employees, and for these
respondents there was a roughly even split between the public and private sector,
with just a few working in the third sector. In the public sector, interviewees were
working in the NHS, in schools, in local government, as civil servants and police
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and fire officers. In the private sector, respondents worked for employers in both
the manufacturing and service sectors. Of the 122 interviewees, only six did not
work due to having to stay at home to care for children, one was unemployed and
one was re-training. Most couples were fully dual-earner couples (both working
full-time), whilst in just over a third of couples, one of the couple (usually,
but not exclusively the female partner) worked part-time. Nearly everyone in
employment was on a permanent contract and the majority worked for large
employers (see Appendix, Table A1 for further information).
Given their number, interviewees were selected to be indicative of households
with these characteristics rather than representative of the whole population of
such households.4 As such, the Family Resources Survey (FRS) has been used
to provide a representative descriptive overview of the unemployment-related
private insurances held by households with these characteristics in England and
Scotland. Commercial market data provided by Experian on private insurance
has also been used (Experian, 2011). Interview transcripts were thematically
analysed, and contextualised results are presented in the following sections, each
associated with a particular field of income protection. The thematic analysis
considered attitudes to the various sources of income protection, both those
which households expect to rely on and those they do not. The interviewees’ own
words are used where illustrative, and attributed to them by anonymised names.
It should be noted that the aim was to identify themes associated with each source
of income protection, rather than to derive a typology of responses or attitudes.
Public provision
Public benefits in many European countries reflect incomes from previous
employment. Earnings-related unemployment insurance in France or Germany,
for example, offers better-paid employees relatively high rates of income
replacement. Flat-rate benefits in the UK are considerably less generous,
particularly from the perspective of better earners. Jobseekers Allowance (JSA),
the current version of publicly available benefits for those unemployed, provides
contributory transfers for six months followed by means-tested JSA support. In
2011, claimants aged twenty-five or older were entitled to JSA of £67.50 per week,
which represented about 10 per cent of average weekly earnings, having steadily
declined from 19 per cent in 1978 (Evans and Williams, 2009: 126). For single
persons out of work for a longer period, calculations indicate that the UK provides
a level of unemployment benefit which puts it among the five least generous of
the twenty-nine OECD countries. Household context matters, however. Taking
account of additional benefits, especially housing allowances, the level of public
provision in the UK relative to other countries improves considerably, at least
for some groups of unemployed (Howell and Rehm, 2009: 83; OECD, 2011: 42).
Still, even relatively modest savings affect the entitlement to means-tested JSA,
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and claimants are disqualified if partners work for twenty-four hours per week
or more. Benefits therefore can be assumed to be of little relevance for better
earners, and especially for households with two adults in paid work.
A second public source of income during unemployment is statutory
redundancy pay. Once again the reliance on statutory redundancy pay offers
relatively little financial security. Many better earners may fulfill the eligibility
requirement of two years service with the same employer and those who are at
least forty-one years old would be paid more than younger colleagues (1.5 rather
than one week’s pay per year of service). However, the maximum number of years
which count towards redundancy pay is twenty and the maximum weekly pay in
2011 was £400. This makes the UK one of the less generous countries in the EU
(Kaupinnen and Meixner, 2005).
The fact that neither JSA nor the statutory redundancy payment provide
levels of income replacement which above-average earners are likely to consider
as adequate is reflected in our interviews. None of the sixty-one couples
regarded statutory redundancy support as a sole source of income security,
and very few expected state benefits to contribute to family income in the
event of unemployment. Even after prompting, only two couples considered
unemployment and related benefits as their prospective main source of income
replacement.
Overall three key themes emerged with regard to public unemployment
benefits: irrelevance, ignorance and ambiguity. Although around a third would
still expect to receive whatever they might be eligible for, most of our respondents
dismissed JSA or other forms of state benefits as irrelevant to them. The level of
unemployment benefit was considered as ‘peanuts’ (Rebecca) or ‘next to nothing’
(Quentin) or ‘a tiny amount’ (Coira) and would ‘probably keep my toothbrush
in batteries for a week’ (Pippa). To some extent such perceptions may have been
influenced by a lack of knowledge. Even when well-judged in terms of the drop
of income these households would experience if they were to rely on JSA as a
sole source of income, most respondents were unclear about the actual (or even
approximate) amount of JSA. Moreover, there was a widespread assumption
that JSA was available only as a means-tested benefit, with respondents ruling
themselves out as being eligible because of savings or their partner’s earnings.
There were ambiguous feelings about the appropriate basis for entitlement to
unemployment support. A notion of reciprocity was strongly supported by many,
although not necessarily linked to national insurance. Interviewees referred more
generally to having ‘paid in’ and thus being entitled to receive support in return.
Representing many others, Justin stated that he had paid ‘probably hundreds of
thousands of pounds of tax over the years’ which should entitle him to receive
some financial return should he find himself out of work. More specifically,
there was some support for a system which ‘for the first three months’ would
pay ‘a wee bit more’ in return for ‘a wee bit higher insurance contributions’
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(Catherine). By contrast, other respondents supported the principle of need as
the appropriate and sole criterion for benefit eligibility, tempered with an anxiety
of potentially encouraging perverse incentives. Benefit claimants in receipt of
various types of transfers, and in particular of housing allowances, were regarded
with suspicion. Even respondents who in the past had relied on JSA themselves
rejected the suggestion of increases in benefit rates: ‘if you gave them more money
they would stay on the social even longer’ (Gavin). This belief was often held in
conjunction with the notion that work was there if you wanted it, even if ‘it was’
stacking shelves at Asda’ or as a ‘security guard’. Similar perceptions of suspicions
of widespread benefit fraud, coupled with claims of a strong personal work ethic,
are common in other countries too (see, for example, Taylor-Gooby and Martin,
2011). However, the strength of the feelings of resentment and dismissal towards
state unemployment benefits was striking and this may arguably be reinforced
by the level and structure of public provision. In any case, our interviews seem to
reflect a clear lack of middle-class solidarity for publicly organised risk sharing
in the area of unemployment compensation (see also Clery, 2012).
Private insurance, savings and property
Private unemployment insurance is faced with a number of actuarial and other
problems (Barr, 2001). One is the status of unemployment itself. The probability
of becoming, and remaining, unemployed is neither random, independent or
individualised. Sudden changes in economic contexts can substantially influence
the incidence of unemployment while the closure of large local companies can
affect other businesses in a particular region, thereby making unemployment
self-reinforcing. Moreover, the actuarial calculation of insurance premiums is
hampered by adverse selection problems, as well as potential moral hazard. The
former refers to the difficulty of insurers to assess individuals’ risk status, the
latter to the inability of monitoring individuals’ behaviour.
This does not mean that private unemployment insurance is not available.
However, it means that insurers tend to offer policies which apply certain
restrictions. For example, stand-alone insurance policies (such as Income
Protection Insurance; IPI) are open only for people with permanent employment
contracts, and provide benefits (typically equal to 50 per cent of previous
earnings) up to a certain maximum.5 Cebulla (2000) estimated that about
6 per cent of working-age individuals were covered by a form of unemployment
insurance in 1997 (see also Burchardt and Hills, 1997). According to the Family
Resources Survey, the proportion of those with stand-alone unemployment or
redundancy cover was below 2 per cent of all households in 2004/05 and around
5 per cent of households with the characteristics of our interviewee group
(Table 1). Amongst the sixty-one couples we interviewed, only two were covered
by an Income Protection Policy (IPI).
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TABLE 1. Households with at least
one policy covering redundancy
(England and Scotland), 2004–05
All
households
Households with
interviewee
characteristics
% 1.76 5.05
N 24,875 1,858
Note: FRS, 2004–05. Estimates produced
using weights. Differences between countries
are not statistically significant.
More common are policies linked to the need to maintain monthly mortgage
payments (Mortgage Payment Protection Insurance – MPPI). Obviously, these
already constitute a restriction of unemployment insurance to somewhat better
risk groups (mortgagers only). Moreover, eligibility rules exclude persons without
permanent work contracts and stipulate a minimum period of employment
(often one year), benefit waiting periods apply (generally between one and three
months), as well as a maximum period of benefit entitlement (typically twelve
months).6
MPPI policies may include other risks such as sickness, accident or death.
Not surprisingly coverage rates are thus somewhat wider than those of IPI
(unemployment) policies. According to Family Resources Survey data for
2009/10, half of the households with the same characteristics as our group of
couples had MPPI and, of this group, 27 per cent had a policy covering them for
unemployment. This is reflected in our interviews. Of the couples we talked to,
fifteen reported some form of unemployment-related MPPI, and seven of these
considered it as their main source of income security in case of unemployment.
For most of these couples, only the loss of the higher (generally but not exclusively
male) income earner was insured. Possibly associated with periods of house
buying and the mortgage industry, younger couples were more likely to have
MPPI than older couples. This is supported by commercially commissioned
surveys which show that MPPI policies are particularly prevalent among couples
in their late twenties up to the early forties who have slightly above-average paying
jobs (Experian, 2011).
While very few couples expected to rely on private unemployment insurance
as their sole source of income replacement, private cover was considered to
contribute to a sense of ‘peace of mind’ which could not, or could only to some
degree, be gained from other forms of income protection, particularly within
a context where accumulating sufficient savings was a perceived impossibility
due to other outgoings. However, having private protection is not necessarily
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evidence of strategic planning associated with unemployment. Since MPPI covers
the inability to make mortgage payments, other risks (such as illness) may be
more relevant for entering into insurance contracts. Indeed, rather than making
references to unemployment insurance specifically, respondents more typically
talked about the need of ‘having the mortgage covered’. Moreover, rather than
pro-actively selecting private unemployment insurance as a form of income
protection, in several cases mortgage advisers seem to have played a role, raising
the level of risk awareness associated with the purchase of mortgages, or even
suggesting that MPPI was a compulsory policy linked to a mortgage deal.
Cheryl: I’m pretty confident we had to do it . . . Whether it was because we were first time
buyers or that was part of the contract, I can’t remember.
A few respondents stated that they would like to have been insured, but
felt that they could not afford it. Some interviewees felt that private insurance
was irrelevant to them given their particular circumstances of perceived job
security (discussed below) or because they relied on other forms of income
protection, such as savings, but this did not mean that they would not consider
it if circumstances changed.
However, many other couples categorically ruled out private unemployment
insurance for three main reasons: cost, value for money and lack of trust.
Many considered it as ‘ludicrously expensive’ (Justin), and a ‘rip off’ (Ted).
The perception of private cover representing poor ‘value for money’ was often
associated with suspicions towards the insurance industry. Since the 1990s,
there have been several widely publicised instances of banks and insurance
companies having to pay compensation for aggressively selling (and mis-selling)
policies, such as private pensions (early 1990s), mortgage repayment products
(early 2000s) and, most recently, policies which cover credit card repayments.
These extensively reported instances may help to explain widespread notions of
mistrust. Respondents stated that ‘there has been a lot of bad press about that sort
of thing’ (Felix), compounding feelings that they would not receive any pay-outs
from the insurance company since ‘there is always a clause that it doesn’t let you
get it’ (Flora), and that banks made ‘an awful lot of money out of them and
they’re very poor at paying out . . . always finding ways that they don’t have to
pay’ (Justin). Some respondents had certain types of optional insurances, such
as life insurance, and considered others as ‘necessary evil, you have to have it on
buildings and cars but I wouldn’t do it on anything else’ (Justine).
Compared with private unemployment insurance, personal savings figured
more prominently as a source of income protection, with two main themes
becoming apparent. For some, savings were regarded as a temporary source of
earnings replacement. Having savings equivalent to three months wages is a
commonly expressed ideal espoused by financial advisors, and was often cited by
our interviewees ‘sort of three months in the bank as a buffer against the random
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stuff happening’ (Ben). Respondents considered savings as a way of compensating
for the loss of earnings at least for some time: ‘we could survive probably with
our savings and that for a year’ (Felix). Couples might also rely on wider family
savings support such as ‘the bank of mum and dad’ (Brian). However, savings as
a stop-gap until another job had been secured were considered as an important
source of income protection typically by couples belonging to the higher income
bracket (see Appendix, Table A1).
At the time of our interviews (2010–11), the financial and subsequent global
economic crisis had become fully manifest. Somewhat surprisingly, this had some,
albeit not very strong, influence on couples’ attitudes towards and engagement
with diverse sources of income protection. However, higher inflation and tax
rises were felt to be putting pressure on disposable income, making savings more
difficult especially for the lower income group. ‘Every time you try to save money
then . . . something happens and you’ve got to spend it on something’ (Quinn). At
least one household had used up savings during a recent spell of unemployment
and expressed that it would take them some time to build up savings to sufficient
levels to provide protection should one partner become unemployed again. In the
case that one partner in the couple was not working full-time, a change in their
working hours in the event of unemployment of their partner was an oft-cited
option by interviewees.
As all of our households were homeowners, and most repaying mortgages,
one option of adjusting to reduced income due to unemployment would be to
take advantage of some mortgage lenders allowing ‘mortgage holidays’, or even
to resorting to re-mortgaging which could free up disposable income. A more
radical option would be ‘downsizing’, that is selling the current property and
moving into a less expensive dwelling. Many households acknowledged this as a
possibility, although most likely only as a last resort after other options had been
exhausted, or in case of longer periods of unemployment. As discussed below,
such a prospect was not expected by any of our couples.
Employers as a source of income security
Severance pay offered by companies beyond that which is legally required forms
part of the employment contract between many employers and employees. Given
the mostly private nature of this agreement, there is a paucity of publicly available
information. There is no comprehensive database or source of government
survey data which would allow for a systematic assessment of the scope of
occupational provision with regards to redundancy pay. Commercial ventures
offer benchmarking services to human resources departments, but this type of
information is not generally available. Nevertheless, it is clear that large employers
in particular often exceed the statutory minimum redundancy requirements
(IDS, 2009), removing the earnings cap on a week’s pay, for example, increasing
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the number of weeks paid per year of service or simply making additional lump-
sum payments to redundant workers. At times such payments are incorporated
in collective agreements but often simply either offered by employers or agreed
with trade unions at times of looming redundancies. Lloyd (2003) found that
most large employers exceeded the statutory minimum. Some agreements in
manufacturing included up to three-and-a-half weeks pay for each year worked
for up to two years, depending on age and completed years of service, with no
earnings cap (Lloyd, 2003). Other corporate arrangements, such as occupational
pension schemes, might be used as part of a redundancy package, offering a
pension more generous than normal to those taking early retirement. In addition,
employers might offer a lump-sum ‘severance payment’ to staff in order to avoid
legal action against dismissal. Currently, £30,000 of any redundancy payment is
tax free.
The relevance of companies compensating staff made redundant can be
gauged in the light of some aggregate information. In 2010–11, the DWP spent a
total of £4.04 billion on JSA to about 1.5 million claimants at any one time (DWP,
2012). By comparison, in 2010 British employers paid out a total £4.4 billion in
redundancy payments to about 470,000 employees, with an average payment of
just under £9,400 (HRmagazine, 2011). It is not only private sector workers but
also many public sector employees, such as NHS staff or civil servants, who are
offered, for example, a month’s (rather than a week’s) pay per year of service.
Many local authorities use other ‘discretionary multipliers’ (e.g. of 1.5 or two
times statutory redundancy pay entitlement) to calculate personal redundancy
pay packages. In 2009, the average payout in the public sector was close to
£18,000 (The Guardian, 5 July 2010). It should be pointed out though that there is
a considerable level of variation, both across sectors and within the same sector.7
Against this background it is not surprising that well over half of our couples
regarded occupational redundancy pay as a very important source of income
protection. This applies especially to those employed in the public sector or by
large private companies. Disregarding strong feelings of job or employment
security (discussed below), couples in the older age bracket and higher
income group in particular perceived firm-level-based redundancy entitlement
as by far the most important single source of income protection in case of
unemployment. By contrast, interviewees who did not think that they could
rely on such protection had either not been in their current job for a sufficient
amount of time, were employed by a less generous private employer or were
self-employed.
On the whole, three themes emerged from our interviews: a general
awareness that the level of redundancy pay is related to tenure, an expectation
of occupational severance pay providing a relatively good level of protection,
but also notions of declining generosity. Typically, couples were unsure about
the exact amount and nature of their potential redundancy packages. However,
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there was a general understanding that this depended on age and the length of
employment with the current organisation.
Justin: ‘Because I’ve been there over ten years, the redundancy packages are pretty good.’
Nigel: ‘I would be okay, because I’m now, you know, getting into the age where it’s going to
cost them more to make me redundant than it is to carry on, me carry on for a few more years.
Ninety weeks’ money and the first 30 grand of that is tax free.’
Some respondents expected considerable amounts (a ‘big wad’, Pippa) that
could provide financial support at current living standards for the household for
a period between jobs for at least six months. Cedric stated, ‘probably a year and
a half maybe. And obviously you would take stringent measures to cut back. So
maybe two years. Two years.’ Others expected to receive sufficient to cover full
wages for half a year or so. Rebecca: ‘it’s not a huge redundancy, but it’s enough
to see us through for about six months so there would be a six month period
where we could live off of that whilst looking for another job’.
A few interviewees had actually experienced redundancy in recent years,
and had received severance pay on what they considered to be generous terms.
Moreover, as new employment had been found relatively quickly in many
cases, redundancy money had not been used as unemployment cover but
as a contribution to savings for something else (such as children’s university
education). However, several interviewees assumed occupational redundancy as
having become less generous in recent years. Mhairi, a public sector employee,
stated: ‘in the past many in my department have had thousands and thousands
of pounds redundancy payment but the government now are reducing that over
time’. Karl, a civil servant, claimed he would be entitled to ‘seventeen or eighteen
months’ salary. But he was also aware of recent cut-backs to redundancy payment
deals in his sector.
It appears that in some instances the switch to less favourable terms was made
more palatable to current employees. Roy, a private sector employee, reported:
what they have done was: right, we give you 40 per cent of that money right now and we’ll
put you on that other redundancy scheme, which doesn’t pay out nearly as much as the old
scheme. They were cutting their losses there and then . . . I was only in the company a couple
of years, so I didn’t get a lot of money (£5,000 which paid off debt) . . . people that have been in
the company maybe twenty or thirty years and they were getting, thirty, forty or fifty thousand
pounds just to buy out the redundancy package.
Several more responses added to an impression of a scaling down of existing
occupational provision in case of redundancy. According to reports in popular
papers there are certainly suggestions of redundancy packages becoming less
generous both in the private and the public sector in recent years (e.g., Daily
Echo, 2 December 2011). Many of our respondents may thus overestimate the
actual and future level of redundancy pay they may be entitled to.
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Discussion and conclusion
The ways in which better-earning households anticipate managing financially
during periods of unemployment needs to be put into a somewhat broader
context. For example, it should be noted that many respondents played down the
prospect of redundancy and expressed a strong sense of either job or employment
security. This was the case particularly amongst those with long tenure and
working for large private companies. But also many public sector staff seemed
to consider their current employment as providing relatively good job security.
Others, who more readily conceived of the possibility of redundancy, regarded
long periods out of work as unlikely due to a confidence in their personal
employability, coupled with a strong work ethic and occupational flexibility.
A typical assumption was that there would always be some kind of work available
due to personal expertise, experience or work contacts. Even where there was
less confidence in a particular employer, many respondents expressed a strong
sense of employment security, as well as willingness to accept jobs below their
particular level of qualification.
The global financial and economic crisis seems to have had little influence on
such attitudes. It appears that direct effects, such as tax increases, rising consumer
prices and lower earnings, as well as longer-term aspects such as the prospects of
lower pensions, have influenced couples’ consumption patterns somewhat but
perceptions (and behaviour) towards income protection much less so.
Given their age, occupational position and biography, this could be regarded
as reasonable. The risk of unemployment is certainly lower for our couples
than for the working population as a whole, and responses seem to reflect
this. Nevertheless, as the global economic crisis has shown, larger companies
are not immune to economic difficulties, and redundancies affect the public
sector too. It could thus be argued that feelings of job security are unduly
optimistic, especially at times of a major economic downturn. However, at
this point it should be reiterated that our analysis has not aimed to contrast
subjective perspectives with actual levels of job security or statistical risks of
unemployment. Instead we have explored couples’ perceptions and expectations
about how they would manage financially during periods of unemployment,
as well as attitudes towards different sources of income protection. Potentially,
investigations of this kind help to improve our understanding of the respective
roles played by public and private types of income security. For example, our
findings suggest that private unemployment insurance has remained a niche
product not because of a widespread lack of ‘financial literacy’, but due to
perceptions of insufficient value for money, a mistrust in the reliability of
private insurance, as well as an anticipation of being entitled to comparatively
generous occupational redundancy pay. Whether such anticipations are justified
or not, whilst being an important question, is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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The discussion has shown that, on the whole, occupational redundancy pay
was clearly perceived as the most important single form of income protection for
better-off earners, often in combination with other sources, such as savings. By
contrast, only very few British households with above-average earnings seem to
consider state benefits as relevant. This is not to say that public provision would
be ignored in the event of need but, on the whole, unemployment benefits were
dismissed or not perceived as an important contribution to household income
during periods out of work. While this may be associated with objectively low
levels of support, respondents’ perceptions play a part given the widespread
assumption that benefits are exclusively needs-based. The politically driven
retrenchment of contributory benefits, combined with an emphasis on means-
testing as the all but exclusive condition for public support, seems to be clearly
reflected in attitudes. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that there is still an
ambiguity about the basis for social rights to benefits, with some support for
reciprocity-based eligibility.
Households were typically not reliant on a single form of income protection
but a combination of sources. However, this is rarely the product of strategic
planning. As discussed, some households were faced with constraints such
as lower disposable income or employment without access to occupational
redundancy pay. Others had more options to act and plan ahead, for example
building up savings. However, as discussed, the extent of pro-active income
protection planning is rather limited. Even the use of private unemployment
insurance tends to be less associated with an active exercise of choice than with
assumptions about what is an appropriate (or required) course of action in the
process of taking out a mortgage. Similarly, the consideration of occupational
redundancy pay as the main or even sole source of income in the case of
unemployment is rarely based on concrete knowledge or active engagement.
Instead, many respondents seem to assume that their current job and employment
biographies would translate into what are widely regarded as reasonable levels of
redundancy pay.
In the absence of concrete information, employees may well put too
much trust in the actual role, and durability, of occupational redundancy
pay. This lack of knowledge at the individual level reflects the absence of
systematic data about policies and practices as operated by companies more
broadly. Based solely on our interviews, it is impossible to infer a general
trend of retrenchment in redundancy pay provision which may well be
akin to the decline in the generosity and scope of occupational pensions
(e.g., Bridgen and Meyer, 2005; Meyer and Bridgen, 2011). However, the
prominence which households seem to attach to occupational redundancy
payment should be ample justification for investigations into the actual scope and
development of company-based social protection over and beyond occupational
pensions.
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Notes
1 The project (ESRC, RES-062-23-1954) explored income protection behaviours and attitudes
of couples with above-average household incomes in England and Scotland. It covered
other areas of expected and unexpected periods of reduced income (pensions, sickness),
as well as periods of major expenditure, both anticipated (paying for the costs of children
in higher education) as well as potential (funding long-term care needs). Interviews were
conducted at the end of 2009 and in early 2010. We would like to thank Traute Meyer
(project Co-Investigator, University of Southampton), Caroline Andow (Research Fellow,
University of Southampton) and Stephan Ko¨ppe (Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh)
for collaboration and research support.
2 A social research agency was used to recruit interviewees according to these criteria, but the
interviews were conducted by members of the academic team.
3 Analysis of the 2009/10 Family Resources Survey data illustrates the distribution of the
characteristics of the qualitative sample in the broader population. These results are available
on request.
4 The project did consider inserting a module into the British Social Attitudes Survey so as to
realise respresentative data, but this was not included in the final research proposal due to
the high costs involved. The FRS does not contain data about attitudes to income protection.
5 A maximum of £2,000 per month is common. Policy premiums vary greatly (Ford et al.,
2004) but the average monthly premium in 2006 was just under £29 (Mintel, 2008: 33).
6 In 2008 a typical monthly premium for MPPI cover was about £5.40 for every £100 insured
(ABI, 2010).
7 A quick web trawl on redundancy pay arrangements within, for example, the British higher
education sector revealed that some universities do not exceed statutory requirements, while
others, often on a ‘discretionary’ basis, make ‘enhanced’ redundancy payments (to some
categories of staff). It also seems that some have recently scaled down the generosity of their
schemes.
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Appendix
TABLE A1. Interviewee sample
Number of households
Household income brackets
£40,000 – £59,000 27
£60,000 – £89,999 29
£90,000 upwards 5
Total households 61
Number of individuals
Activity status
Full-time employed 78
Part-time employed 24
Self-employed (full-time or part-time) 12
Stay-at-home carer 6
Unemployed or in training 2
Total individuals 122
Sector
Public 45
Private 54
Not for profit 3
Contract type
Permanent 96
Fixed term or casual 6
Size of employer
Small 11
Medium 6
Large 85
Total employed 102
